

Expressing promise in religious discourse Surah al anbya is a sample

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Abstract

A promise is a declaration or commitment to do or not do something in the future. It can also refer to the potential for future success or excellence, as in "a writer with great promise". In religious contexts, a promise is a solemn declaration or commitment, most notably those made by a deity to humanity or a specific community, and those made by individuals to their deity or to others. These promises are foundational to faith, hope, and the establishment of covenants. The current study aims to investigate promise in Surah al-Anbya. It tries to shed light on the direct and implied expression of promise in this sura. The current paper aims to investigate the speech act of promise in the Glorious Quran and how this theme is expressed.

Keywords: (promise, religious context, commitment, Surah al anbya).

التعبير عن الوعد في الخطاب الديني سورة الأنبياء نموذجاً
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المخلص

الوعد هو إعلان أو التزام بفعل أو عدم القيام بشيء ما في المستقبل. ويمكن أن يشير أيضاً إلى إمكانية النجاح أو التميز في المستقبل، كما هو الحال في "كاتب ذو وعد عظيم". في السياقات الدينية، الوعد هو إعلان أو التزام رسمي، وأبرزها تلك التي قطعها إله للإنسانية أو مجتمع معين، وتلك التي قطعها الأفراد لإلههم أو للآخرين. هذه الوعود هي أساس الإيمان والرجاء وتأسيس العهود. تهدف الدراسة الحالية إلى دراسة

الوعد في سورة الأنبياء. وهو يحاول تسليط الضوء على التعبير المباشر والضمني للوعد في هذه السورة. يهدف بحث التيارات إلى دراسة الفعل الكلامي للوعد في القرآن الكريم وكيفية التعبير عن هذا الموضوع. الكلمات المفتاحية: (الوعد، السياق الديني، التزام، سورة الانبياء).

1-Introduction

Promises are commitments made between people that signify trust and dependability. Fulfilling promises strengthens bonds and builds honesty. The current paper sheds on the linguistic cues by which promises are expressed in the Glorious Qur'an in Surah Al-Anbya.

1.1 The Problem of the Study

Many previous studies have tackled the speech act of promising from different perspectives, but without giving a wide scope to the linguistic levels that might be utilized to deliver this act. Also, no study showed whether this act can be delivered directly or indirectly.

1.2 The Aims of the Study

The current study aims to:

1. Identify the linguistic levels by which the speech act of Promise can be expressed.
2. Examine whether the speech act of promise direct or indirect.
3. Investigating the pragmatic cues by which this theme is expressed in the Glorious Quran.
4. Analyzing the speech act of promise in Surat Al-Anbya.

1.3 The Questions of the Study

1. How can be promise expressed?
2. Is the speech act of promise direct or indirect?
3. Hoe this theme is delivered in the Glorious Quran?

1.4 The Procedures of the Study

The current study is carried out with the following procedures: Identifying the linguistic levels by which the speech act of promise can be expressed and examining whether the speech act of promise direct or indirect. Then, an analysis of the theme in the Glorious Quran is discussed and taking surat al-Anbya as a sample.

1.5 The Limits of The Study

The study is limited only to presenting theoretical background about the pragmatic concept "promise" and analyzing this theme in surat al-Anbya.

1.6 The Value of the Study

This study will be valuable for those who are interested in studying religious texts and the Glorious Quran specially. Also the study will be significant for those who want to study other pragmatic concepts in surat al-Anbya.

2. Literature Review

2.1 Speech Act Theory

The speech act theory is an essential aspect of pragmatics that explores the role of language, which is not only used to convey messages but also to perform certain functions in the context in which the messages are conveyed (Searle, 1979: 22). The speech act theory was pioneered by J. L. Austin in his seminal publication **How to Do Things with Words** (1962). The speech act theory postulates that the act of uttering words can cause changes in the world by the mere act of speaking (Austin, 1962: 1). For instance, the sentence "I apologize for my mistake" is an apparently straightforward sentence that simultaneously performs several speech acts. The sentence conveys the idea that the speaker regrets having done something (the locutionary act) (Searle, 1979: 23). The sentence also conveys the intent of the speaker to take responsibility for the action by using the word "apologize" (the illocutionary act) (Austin, 1962: 101).

In short, the goal is to fix a damaged relationship, and this is an example of a perlocutionary act (Searle, 1979: 24). The roots of speech acts can be found in the ideas of J.L. Austin, a philosopher from Britain, who in his book **How to Do Things with Words** (1962) argued against the then-prevailing notion that the sole function of language is to communicate factual information (Austin, 1962: 10). In fact, Austin claimed that the spoken word often performs an action that alters the state of affairs around us, such as when one says, "I apologize," and this is not just stating that one is sorry, but rather performing the action of apologizing, which can change the state of affairs in the relationship between the speaker and the hearer (Austin, 1962: 15).

The concept of illocutionary force was introduced by John R. Searle, a prominent figure in the field, who further developed the theory (Searle, 1969: 23). It refers to the particular action that is performed in the course of the utterance, for example,

stating, asking, promising, or commanding (Searle, 1969: 24). For example, the sentence "This cake is delicious" not only describes the cake, but it also expresses the speaker's opinion. The theory does not only focus on the identification of the action performed through the sentence; it also focuses on the identification of the factors that lead to the felicity of the action:

Speaker's intention: Was the speaker's intention to carry out a particular action through the utterance?

- Hearer's interpretation: Did the hearer understand the speaker's intention and the illocutionary force of the utterance? (Searle, 1969: 68-69)
- Social context: Do the existing social conventions and norms help the speaker carry out the action?
- Shared knowledge: Do the speaker and the hearer possess the relevant knowledge for understanding the action? (Searle, 1969: 70)

For example, the illocutionary act of making a request, as in the case of saying "Please pass the salt," will not be successful if the speaker whispers the words and turns away from the hearer.

2.2 Types of Speech Act Theory

The Speech Act Theory, an important part of the study of pragmatics, takes language beyond the actual meaning of words to examine the acts we perform through language (Searle, 1995: 1). It helps us better understand the ways in which we use language to shape the world, make promises, show our feelings, etc. The core concept of Speech Act Theory is the idea of "force," a complex idea that examines the intentions of the speaker and the impact of the message on the listener (Austin, 1962: 101).

The locutionary force refers to the meaning that is inherently connected with the spoken words in a sentence. For instance, the sentence "The cat is on the mat" carries the locutionary force of asserting the location of the cat. This interpretation of the sentence, i.e., the literal meaning of the sentence, represents the first level of analysis of the intended meaning of what the speaker wants to say. (Austin, 1962: 99).

The second level of understanding the intended meaning of the speaker is the illocutionary force, which embodies the purpose of the speaker's communication. The sentence "The cat is on the mat" carries the illocutionary force of informing the listener of the cat's location, inquiring about the cat's location, or even warning the

listener of the cat's mischief, given that the cat is known to get into mischief. (Searle, 1979: 6-7)

The perlocutionary force deals with the impact of the utterance on the person being spoken to. Although the speaker intends a certain illocutionary act with their utterance, for example, asking for something, the interpretation of this act by the person being spoken to and their subsequent actions determine the perlocutionary force. For instance, in the utterance "Can you pass the salt?" by a speaker, the speaker intends that this utterance should be a request. However, in response to this utterance, the person being spoken to should either pass the salt (one perlocutionary force of this utterance) or acknowledge the speaker's request (alternative perlocutionary force of this utterance). This view of perlocutionary force points to the dynamic nature of communication in which the speaker's intention and interpretation by the person being spoken to result in a certain outcome (Austin, 1962: 101).

Another group of speech acts that can be identified includes representatives. This group includes those utterances that are meant for providing information, and they are normally considered either true or false. Examples of such utterances include "The Earth revolves around the Sun" or "I went to the store earlier." When providing this kind of information, the speaker can influence the recipient's beliefs or knowledge (Levinson, 1983, p. 232).

The directives are another class of speech acts, and their aim is to make the hearer perform a particular action. They are often expressed in the form of an imperative, like "Close the window," or a request, like "Can you please pass the salt?" What the speaker intends in these cases is to impact the behavior of the hearer, and the success of a directive relies upon the compliance of the hearer (Verschueren, 1999, 112).

The commissives form a class of speech acts that are associated with the speaker's prospective commitments. Some examples of commissives include "I will finish this report by tomorrow" or "If you don't clean your room, there will be consequences." Through these speech acts, the speaker is engaging in obligations and consequences related to future conduct (Austin, 1962, p. 98).

The speech act of expressives is meant to convey the speaker's psychological states, emotions, or feelings (Levinson, 1983, p. 234). For example, "Congratulations on your promotion" or "I'm deeply sorry for your loss" are all

examples of expressives. The main purpose of expressives is to connect emotionally with the hearer.

The speech act of declarations is unique in that it has the ability to bring about changes in the real world by the act of declaring itself. For example, “I hereby declare you husband and wife” or “I hereby resign from my job” are all examples of speech acts of declarations. The ability of the speaker to bring about changes in the real world is dependent on the speaker’s authority or convention (Searle, 1979, p. 70).

However, it is important to note that these speech act categories are not mutually exclusive, and at times, one speech act can have more than one element of different speech act categories. For example, the speech act “It’s a beautiful day, wouldn’t it be nice to go for a walk?” can be seen to have elements of both representative and directive speech acts (Yule, 1996, p. 57).

2.3 Felicity conditions

One of the major components of Austin’s theory of speech acts is the concept of felicity and infelicity, which are associated with happiness and unhappiness, respectively. As has been mentioned, illocutionary acts are ‘doings’ or ‘actions’ that are performed, not only the physical action of speaking. The concept of felicity relates to the level of successful performance of the action. If the action is successfully performed, the speech acts are described as ‘felicitous’; otherwise, the acts are ‘infelicitous’ (Austin, 2018, p. 16).

Infelicities are the terms given to the circumstances in which the performance of illocutionary acts might fail or diverge from the expected performance. A large part of "How to Do Things with Words" is focused on the identification, determination, classification, description, and exemplification of infelicities. In order to determine the ways in which a given speech situation can be effective, it is also necessary to define the circumstances of inadequacy. The study of what can fail in the performance of speech acts prompted Austin to study the circumstances in which the felicity of the performance can be achieved. For the felicity of the performance of the illocutionary acts to be achieved, certain conditions related to language and extra-linguistic conditions need to be satisfied, which are referred to as the felicity conditions (Austin, 2018: 14).

Felicity conditions, according to Austin, are the conditions that must be met in order for the utterance to be deemed a successful (felicitous) act (Austin 2018: 45).

Austin proposed that, in the absence of satisfaction, the speech act cannot be redeemed, and the satisfaction of the conditions must serve as a standard measure to determine whether the particular illocutionary act meaningfully contributes to the speech situation.

Austin posited that the basis of illocutionary acts is rooted in conventions, and the successful fulfillment of the act, making it felicitous, is based on the satisfaction of the felicity conditions (Austin 2018: 14). He further proposed that the felicity conditions are the expression of particular social conventions (Harris, Fogal and Moss 2018: 2).

The notion of convention, as part of the theory of speech, suggests that these conditions are “outside” the speaker. Further exploration of this “outside” character in comparison with internal conditions will be discussed in Chapter 6 of this volume, Convention and intention with regard to conditions of successful performance of speech acts, as part of a discussion of externalism and internalism in speech acts by Harnish (2009).

Generally, context is seen as being of primary importance in relation to the analysis of speech acts. The context of utterance is related to the circumstances of occurrence of the speech act. Accordingly, these circumstances are of primary importance in relation to determining the felicity of a speech act. The circumstances of occurrence of a speech act are not internal to the speech act and are related to extralinguistic factors. Illocutionary acts are typically those that are situated in relation to the circumstances of occurrence of a speech act from a pragmatic perspective.

Austin, in his book, contends that a theory of speech acts that is competent must also include an inquiry into “the total situation” and “the total speech act.” Furthermore, in the discussion of the felicity conditions, it is implied that they are not spoken and are, instead, dependent upon convention. In this case, it is essential that the situational context that informs the illocutionary acts is also in conformity with the conventions. Moreover, the relevance of the situational appropriateness to the illocutionary acts is also underscored by Austin, who, in general terms, contends that the circumstances that are attendant to the speech must, in some respect, be appropriate, and it is often the case that it is necessary that the speaker or the other persons perform some further acts, which can be physical, mental, and even further speech acts (Austin, 2018: 8).

Thus, to evaluate the felicity of an illocutionary act, it is necessary to go beyond the propositional content of the speaker's utterance and incorporate the actions of other speakers and the context in which the act is performed. In other words, the entire speech situation must be taken into account to evaluate the felicity of the act, and if the act is not felicitous, the grounds for infelicity must be determined. In conformity with the felicity conditions proposed by Austin, Searle's approach is designed to "determine what conditions are necessary and sufficient for the act of promising to have been successfully and non-defectively performed in the utterance of a given sentence" (Searle, 1969: 54). Searle's 'defective illocutionary act' is similar to Austin's 'infelicitous illocutionary act.'

It is obvious that, while there are substantial differences between Searle's and Austin's theories in various respects, which will be discussed in the following chapters, the idea of felicity conditions put forward by Austin was the basis for the development of other types of conditions within the frameworks of other speech act theories. Before moving on to the classification of infelicities proposed by Austin, let us discuss the difference between truth conditions and felicity conditions.

2.4 Promises

2.4.1 Definition of Promises

Promise is a speech act that is ubiquitously attested in all languages. This speech act is considered a basic act for maintaining social affiliations amongst individuals within a given society. This speech act can be performed and blocked in all areas of life. However, the use of this speech act, whether explicit or implicit, varies across cultures and societies. There exists ambiguity in the application of this speech act, especially when it is used in literature and religious writings, considering that these writings are considered communicative acts between the Addresser, who is Allah, and the communicants. Therefore, analysis of the text from the pragmatic meaning of these discourses can reduce ambiguity.

2.4.2 The Linguistic Characterization of Promises

2.4.2.1 Sematic View of Promise

From this semantic point of view, commissive verbs are seen as acts that commit the speaker to carrying out a certain action specified in the propositional content. It can therefore be argued that to commit oneself to doing an act involves stating an intention to do an act and believing that one is committed to carrying out the act.

Commissives have been identified by Austin (1962:151) as "typically characterized by their similarity to promises or undertakings, where the speaker commits himself to a course of action, and in doing so, may commit himself to declarations or announcements of his intentions." Various linguists such as Searle (1979:14), Fraser (1975:193), Traugott and Pratt (1980:230), Allan (1986:195-6), Hamblin (1987:33), and Hurford and Heasley (1996:262) are in agreement that "the fundamental goal of commissives is to commit the speaker to doing some particular act, and this includes such acts as promise, pledge, threat, vow, swear, etc., and these are all part of a unified family of commissive."

Partridge (1982:115) and Leech (1983:106) admit that they are indisputably future-oriented. Hurford and Heasley (1996:262) and Searle (1979:14) claim that commissives and directives are the most essential actions in terms of maintaining the social fabric of our everyday lives, as they are responsible for producing changes in the world by creating an obligation located in S rather than in H, as in directives.

2.4.2.2 Syntactic View

Some philosophers and linguists have devoted considerable attention to verbs which indicate the future. Of these, promise is a verb which indicates futureness. According to Traugott (2002:2), promise is a deverbal noun in Latin, borrowed from French.

Palmer (1963:276-283) describes four patterns of using promise:

a- [Sub] + V + Oi + Od

I promise you a present.

b- [Sub] + V + Od + prep + prep. Object.

I promise a book for you success.

c- [Sub.] + V + to-infinitive

I promise not to visit you.

d- [Sub.] + V + Od + that clause

I promise you that the work will be finished before evening.

In a similar manner, Hornby (1968:206) states that the verb 'promise' may take (not) to-infinitive, two objects, and a that-clause. Palmer (1976:189) suggests two patterns:

a- NP1 + V + [(NP1) + V]

I promise to come tomorrow.

b- NP1 + V + NP2 [NP1 + V]

I promise John to meet Mary. (I promise John that I should meet Mary).

In a similar manner, Leech (1983:206) contends that commissive verbs have two patterns:

a- Sub. + V + (you) that + X.

b- (where X is a non-indicative clause)

c- Sub. + V + (you) to + Y.

(where Y is an infinitive construction).

Some grammarians such as Jespersen (1954:270); Eckersley (1961:84); Bright (1964:79); Wood (1965:171); Ward (1972:21-22); and Eckersley (1980:164-5) are quoted in this tradition.

Eastwood and Mackin (1989:60) agree that there is a close connection between the future modals 'shall' and 'will' and the promise of doing something, and that these verbs can be used to indicate a promise in certain circumstances. They observe that a first-person promise is normally made with 'will':

- I (we) will meet you at ten o'clock.

2.4.2.3 Pragmatic View of Promise

When a person says, for example, "I promise to meet you tomorrow," they are not simply stating a fact or expressing a feeling. They are trying to accomplish something through words. Hayakawa describes this type of language as a directive. In the speech act of promising, which is a directive speech act that refers to the future, the speaker has a moral obligation to be as sure as possible.

Austin (1962:10-11) says that promising is not only a matter of saying the words, but it is also an internal, spiritual process. For a promise to be genuine, the promisor must have a real intention and moral obligation to keep the promise. Otherwise, the promise will be untrue.

Austin (ibid:69) also distinguishes between explicit and implicit performatives. In explicit performatives, there is an explicit performative utterance that explicitly states the act being performed, whereas in implicit performatives, there is no explicit performative utterance, although the utterance still has the illocutionary force.

- I promise to visit you tomorrow. (explicit)

- I'll visit you tomorrow. (implicit)

Leech (1983:107) further proposes that politeness can also be analyzed from the tact maxim, which involves a cost and benefit calculation to reach a certain level of politeness. In this respect, the promisor deliberately commits to a future act for the promisor's own purpose, taking the cost personally and shouldering the entire responsibility.

In the same vein, Searle (1969:58) describes promise as "a pledge to do something for you, not to you." There is agreement from pragmatists like Fraser (1975:187-210), Partridge (1982:120-126), Matreyck (1983:61), Iwan (1986:172-173) that the action involved in promising can be expressed through the use of the progressive aspect as seen in (1), through emphasis as seen in (2), through mitigation/hedging through the use of modal auxiliaries as seen in (3), and through the nominal form as seen in (23). For instance: I am hereby promising you to stop telling lies.

1- I do promise to come early.

2- I will promise you that we will not be late.

3- I'll make you a promise, I'll never lie again.

According to Ise (1998:17), "a promise is made whenever a person indicates his intention by a suitable sign in the appropriate context." Promises are closely tied to the real world. Every new promise establishes a new moral commitment on the part of the promisor (ibid: 7).

In some cases, the promise is performed hand in hand with another speech act.

- "It won't happen again, I promise." (an act of apologizing wrapped in a promise)
- as cited in Trosborg (1995:383).

Some linguists, such as Lyons (1981:187), Trosborg (1995:19), and Egner (2002:3), believe that the speech act of making promises is culture-specific because it is based on local legal, religious, and ethical rules and regulations. Egner (2002:4) asserts that the speech act of making promises is recognized as a commitment to perform an action in any society around the world, and the speaker (S) is bound to perform the promise in the Western world. In order to save face while performing the speech act of making promises, the speaker should be able to perform the action that is being promised, as the speaker's face will be at stake if the speaker promises and is not able to perform the action.

In this case, the speaker can perform the speech act of making promises as a non-binding promise, also known as the 'polite promise.' This is performed to save face and to close the conversation politely. In most cases, the performance of the speech

act of making promises is performed through the use of the condition. In this case, Beller (2002:113) asserts that the performance of the conditional speech acts obliges the addressee to perform a specific action or to refrain from performing the action, while the speaker shows a positive value to himself as he makes the promise.

- "If you lend me your bike, I will help you with your homework." The speaker believes that the addressee needs help with the homework and shows a positive reaction to the action performed by the addressee, while the reaction is negative to the action that is not performed by the addressee (Beller, 2002:113).

3. Data Description, Methodology and Data Analysis

3.1 Data Description

The glorious Qur'an is full with deep themes and ideas. Promise is chosen in this paper to be studied. The current study selects surah al-Anbaya as a sample to be analyzed to expose the linguistic tools that are used to deliver the meaning of promise in this surah.

3.2 Methodology

Descriptive and analytical methods are used in this paper to analyze the speech act of "promise" in surah al-Anbaya.

3.3 Data Analysis

The word 'promise' occurs into ways; direct and indirect. As it is known, in the Glorious Qur'an, Allah give His orders regarding promises, threats, punishment and other themes in different ways. The following sections discuss this idea.

3.3.1 Direct Promise

Text1

((ثُمَّ صَدَقْنَاهُمُ الْوَعْدَ فَأَنْجَيْنَاهُمْ وَمَنْ نَشَاءُ وَأَهْلَكْنَا الْمُسْرِفِينَ))

Text2

((وَأَقْرَبَ الْوَعْدُ الْحَقُّ فَإِذَا هِيَ شَاخِصَةٌ أَبْصَارُ الَّذِينَ كَفَرُوا يَا وَيْلَنَا قَدْ كُنَّا فِي غَفْلَةٍ مِنْ هَذَا بَلْ كُنَّا ظَالِمِينَ))

Text3

((وَيَقُولُونَ مَتَى هَذَا الْوَعْدُ إِنْ كُنْتُمْ صَادِقِينَ))

Allah the Almighty says: "Until, when Gog and Magog are let loose, the true promise draws near." This means that it is related to Allah's promise that He has promised His servants that He will resurrect them from their graves as recompense, reward, and punishment. Indeed, this is true as He, the Most High, has affirmed.

Scholars have offered ideas similar to what we have interpreted regarding this issue. As for what follows: “Then behold, it is the eyes of those who disbelieved staring,” there are two aspects regarding what comes before it: one as a metaphor that has been explained by what comes next.

As for what follows: “Woe to us! We were indeed in heedlessness of this,” He says that the eyes of the disbelievers will stare at what comes next: “Then behold, the true promise will come upon them.” They will exclaim: “Woe to us! We were previously heedless in this world of what we now witness and endure, and of the grievous calamity that has befallen us.” In this discussion, a certain element has been omitted. However, this omission has been indicated through what has been stated previously.

This is how they interpret what comes next: “Then behold, the eyes of those who disbelieved will start in horror.” They will exclaim: “Woe to us!” Moreover, as for what follows: “Rather, we were wrongdoers,” He has conveyed what those who disbelieved in Allah would confess on that day: “We did not act on that day in a manner that would protect us from what has afflicted us; rather, we were wrongdoers, disobeying Allah and following Satan and his armies by associating partners with Allah the Almighty.”

Directly, The word "promise" is mentioned in Surah Al-Anbaya and other surahs of the Holy Quran to refer to the Day of Resurrection and the great events it will bring, and to emphasize the truth of what Allah has informed the prophets of regarding the unseen, whether they are promises of goodness for believers or warnings of punishment for unbelievers. The following meanings are delivered by the direct occurrence of 'promise':

-The Promise of salvation and victory: It is mentioned in the Almighty's saying: "Then We fulfilled the promise to them and saved them and whomever We willed, and destroyed the transgressors." This promise includes the salvation of the prophets and true believers and the destruction of the deniers and those who transgressed in their disbelief.

-To emphasize the unseen: The promise in Surah Al-Anbaya' refers to the unseen facts that Allah informed the prophets of, such as the Day of Resurrection and its events, confirming the truth of what the prophets brought.

-Warning and glad tidings: The promise includes two aspects: the threat of punishment for the unbelievers, and the promise of Paradise for the believers, which carries a warning for the wrongdoers and glad tidings for the righteous.

-A Reminder of the Day of Judgment: The promise in the Surah reminds people of the Day of Judgment and its consequences, motivating them to do good deeds and refrain from sins.

-A Statement of God's Law in Creation: The promise demonstrates that God never breaks His promise, that He will support His messengers and believers and destroy the unbelievers and criminals. This demonstrates Allah's Law in Creation.

3.3. 2 Implied Promise

Text1

((وَأَسْمَاعِيلَ وَإِدْرِيسَ وَذَا الْكِفْلِ كُلٌّ مِنَ الصَّابِرِينَ (٨٥) وَأَدْخَلْنَاهُمْ فِي رَحْمَتِنَا إِنَّهُمْ مِنَ الصَّالِحِينَ (٨٦) وَذَا النُّونِ إِذْ ذَهَبَ مُغَاضِبًا فَظَنَّ أَنْ لَنْ نَقْدِرَ عَلَيْهِ فَنَادَى فِي الظُّلُمَاتِ أَنْ لَا إِلَهَ إِلَّا أَنْتَ سُبْحَانَكَ إِنِّي كُنْتُ مِنَ الظَّالِمِينَ (٨٧))

In general, it can be said that Surah Al-Anbaya contains implicit promises to believers of victory and empowerment in this world and the hereafter, along with threats and warnings to those who deny it. These promises are revealed through the stories of previous prophets, the description of the consequences for those who deny it, and the mention of the approaching Day of Resurrection and the just recompense.

The implicit promise in Surah Al-Anbaya' is represented by Allah Almighty's promises to His believing servants of victory and empowerment in this world and the hereafter, along with warnings and threats to the nations that deny Him. This promise is evident in several verses, including the verse, "Then We fulfilled the promise to them and saved them and whomever We willed and destroyed the transgressors." Allah Almighty informs us that He fulfilled His promise to the believers of salvation and destroyed the transgressors who denied Him.

In Surah Al-Anbaya, we find Allah Almighty recounting the stories of previous prophets and their peoples, and mentioning how Allah saved the believers from the punishment of the nations that denied Him. This reminder of the stories of the prophets is an implicit promise to the believers at the time of the Prophet Muhammad (peace and blessings be upon him) that Allah will grant them victory as He granted victory to the previous prophets. At the same time, it is a threat and

warning to the nations that denied Him that they will meet the same fate if they do not believe.

In addition, there is a reference to the implicit promise of victory in the verse, "And they say, 'When will this promise come, if you should be truthful?'" This demonstrates the disbelievers' mockery and skepticism of God's promise of victory for the believers. This mockery indicates that they realize that the promise of victory means the loss of their power and their defeat, which is what drives them to rush the promise and deny it.

It is noticed that this implied mentioning of 'promise' has the following messages:

- Remembering of the Judgment: The surah begins by reminding people of the imminent judgment and their neglect of it, urging them to prepare for the Day of Judgment.

- Stories of the Prophets: The surah presents the stories of a group of prophets, such as Noah, Abraham, Lot, Moses, Aaron, and others, highlighting their role in calling people to God and some aspects of their lives.

- Monotheism and the Denial of Polytheism: The surah addresses the issue of monotheism, refutes the doubts of polytheists, and refutes their claims about polytheism.

- Proof of Allah's Power and Oneness: Allah's power is manifested in the creation of the heavens and the earth and the management of the universe, while emphasizing His Oneness and the denial of any partner.

- The End of the Deniers: The surah mentions the fate of the nations that denied their messengers, as a warning to people of the consequences of denial.

4. Conclusion

Speech Act Theory, first articulated by the likes of J.L. Austin, later refined by J.R. Searle, has been nothing short of revolutionary for philosophy of language as well as linguistics. At its core, it challenges our focus from the message of the word to the intent behind the word, as well as the action of the word. It's an important concept because it highlights the fact that language is not just reflective of the world, but also instrumental in shaping the world.

The word 'promise' is mentioned more than once directly and sometimes implidly in surah Al-Anbaya. The aim is to prove the nearness of the Judgment and people's neglect of it, while explaining the role of the prophets in calling to aLLAH and His Oneness.

Also, it has been reported that its merit is that it is a reason for God to hold the servant to account easily, shake hands with him, and for the angels to greet him. Whoever recites it and sleeps while holding it in his waist will see wonders in his dream.

5. Recommendations

- A study could be conducted investigating the metaphorical implication of indirect use of the word 'promise' in other surahs.
- A study could be conducted on the implied messages in surah al-anbaya and investigating the linguistic techniques used to deliver this idea.
- "The Presupposition Triggers in Surah Al-Anbaya" could be conducted to be studied.

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